IXI
This document serves as technical basis for the radiation and contamination trending program for SNFP and change needed to update and maintain current. Initial issue, revision 0, EDT-624930 Replaced Title page wich three new pages due to site requirements change. Page 6 . The program consists of standardized radiation and contamination surveys of the KE Basin, radiation surveys of the KW basin, and radiation surveys of the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVD) with the associated tracking. This report also discusses the remainder of radiological areas within the SNFP that do not have standardized trending programs and the basis for not having this program in those areas.
TECHNICAL BASIS

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROJECT RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION TRENDING PROGRAM
Background
The K Basins contain approximately 2000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel. This fuel is contained in two pools which were designed and built during the 1950's. This fuel was originally designed for approximately 150 days of storage following use. Some fuel in the basins is approaching 25 years in storage. A significant fraction of the fuel assemblies were breached during discharge from the N Reactor and subsequent handling. A recent survey determined that approximately 40% of the fuel assemblies in KE are damaged to some extent. Corrosion of the exposed metallic uranium results in the continuous release of radionuclides into the basin water.
The current plans consists of removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying in the Cold Vacuum Drying facility (CVD), conditioning and sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage in the Canister Storage Building (CSB), for up to 40 years pending decisions on ultimate disposition. Subsequent to fuel removal, activities include transfer of the basin sludge to Hanford's T-Plant for management, disposal of non-SNF basin debris in the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) burial ground at the Hanford Site, disposition of the basin water, and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning.
In support of moving fuel, major construction involving major modifications to old facilities and construction of new facilities is ongoing. 
Facility Management Responsibilities
KE Area
KE Basin
The 105 KE basin was prepared for the long-term storage of N Reactor fuel in 1973. The water treatment systems initially installed in the 105 KE basin consisted of a primary recirculation loop with a heat exchanger and cartridge filters. The cooling water for the heat exchanger was drawn from the Columbia River. Thus, the basin water temperatures fluctuated seasonally with the Facility Descriptions/History and Radiological Status river temperature. The cartridge filters provided the only means of removing radioactivity; they were rated to exclude particles with sizes of 5 micrometers or larger.
Modifications to the 105 KE basin proved to be inadequate. The concrete walls and basin floor were not cleaned or coated. The fuel in the basin was stored in open canisters, allowing unrestricted contact between the basin water and the damaged fuel. Much of the fuel shipped to 105 KE had a much higher bumup than the weapons grade he1 and had already been in storage in the N Reactor basin for several years. Filtered water from the Columbia River was used initially to fill the 105 KE pool and replace water lost through evaporation or leakage. The water quality in the basin deteriorated rapidly during the first years of operation, resulting in high radionuclide concentrations in the water and high corrosion rates of some metals (principally aluminum, copper alloys, and carbon steel).
A considerable fraction of fission products that leached from the fuel became imbedded in the bare concrete walls and recirculation piping, resulting in high dose rates, particularly at work locations above the walls.
In 1978, the water treatment loop was modified to include a sand filter and IXCs in an attempt to lower radionuclide concentrations. The IXCs were loaded with a cesium-specific zeolitic resin that reduced the 137Cs concentrations in the water to acceptable levels. However, "Sr and tritium concentrations continued to increase, as did concentrations of nonradioactive ions that were not removed by the zeolitic resin. These measures had little effect on dose rates in the basin because the cesium and strontium, already imbedded in the basin walls, were the primary source of the dose. Over the next few years, several steps were taken to improve water quality in 105 KE pool. Strontium-specific ion exchange resins were tested; water lost though evaporation or leakage was replaced with deionized water; hydrogen peroxide was used to control algae growth (replacing the chlorine-based algaecides); and the water-cooled heat exchanger was replaced with a refrigerant chiller to maintain consistently low temperatures in the basin. Despite these efforts, the water chemistry in the basin continued to degrade.
In 1986, the IXCs in 105 KE basin were charged with mixed-bed resin, and the basin was slowly deionized over a six-(6) month period. Basin water conductivity was reduced from 280 microSicm to 5 microSicm, and the "Sr concentrations were reduced from 75 microCiiL to 1 microCiiL through this effort. The improvement in water quality markedly decreased uniform corrosion and pitting rates on corrosion specimens in the basin. The corrosion rate of the uranium metal in the basin was also markedly reduced, evidenced by a three-fold reduction in 137Cs leach rate, following de-ionization. 
Year
The basin is currently posted a RadiatiodContamination Area (RA/CA). There is one high radiation area at the Ion Exchange Column (IXC) shielded enclosure. The four roof vents are posted and controlled as CA's. There are various other radiological areas such as Fixed Contamination Areas (FCA), Radioactive Materials Areas (RMA), and Radiological Buffer Areas (RBA).
Dose rates in these "other" types of radiological areas are generally < 0.5 mR/hr.
4.1.2
Located outside on the East Side of 105 KE, this corrugated sheet metal building is used for storage of non-radioactive materials and currently contains no radiological areas.
1614-KE: Environmental Monitoring Station
Located equidistant from 105 KE and 105 KW, this old concrete block structure was used as an environmental monitoring station and also as a source storage location for reactor start-up sources. The sources were removed several years ago and the building currently contains no radiological areas.
4.1.4
Located south of the 1706 KE and 105 KE buildings, this building was originally designed as a safety class, bomb resistant structure and was used to house the main control of the K Basins water plants, boilers, and emergency power service. This building contains a FCA in a basement tunnel, but no other radiological areas.
181-KE: River Pump House
Located north of the KE basin, on the Columbia River, this building contains the pumps used to pump river water to the 183 KE building for processing into drinking water and other uses. There are currently no radiological areas in the structure, however, there are outdoor radiological areas controlled by Bechtel Hanford that border the facility.
119-KE: Exhaust Air Sample Building
165-KE: Power Control Building Elect switchgear, Control Room
4.1.6
Located south of 190KE building, this building is used to process river water into potable and other uses. Much of the facility is no longer used. This facility housed the radiological counting facility at one time, which has since been relocated to 1706 KE. Currently, no radiological areas exist in the facility. There is systems which contain natural radioactivity from the past water processing operations with Alum. Work in these areas is controlled by the JCS system.
183-KE: Clearwells, Filters, Sedimentation Basins, Headhouse, and Chlorine Vault
185-K Package Water Treatment Plant
Located beside 183KE, the 185-K building contains a newly constructed package water treatment plant that provides potable water, service water and fire protection water for the lOOK area.
There are no radiological areas in this facility.
190-KE: Main Pump House
Located southeast of 1706KE, this building is currently used as a warehouse for SNFP, paint storage area, and excess equipment storage. Currently contains a small RMA (-400 ft2 ) for the storage of equipment.
1706-KE: Water Studies Semi-works Facility
Located south of 105KE, the 1706-KE building supplied eight single pass process tubes in the KE Reactor core and contained 22 external reactor test loops. All of these facilities have been deactivated. Used as a development laboratory for various Hanford projects over the years, 1706KE currently houses the SNFP Counting facility, and other operations/engineering personnel. Contains various radiological areas throughout its three levels. The 0' level contains the counting facility and all the other manned operations. There is RBAiRMA postings associated with the counting facility and other FCA's and internally contaminated piping. The -13' contains FCA's and internally contaminated piping but is not routinely occupied. The -27' level (pump room) contains no radiological areas.
1706-KEL: Development Laboratory
Attached to 1706KE, this building was used as a development laboratory for various Hanford projects over the years. Currently houses waste operations group, provides storage, and is being used as a radiological training facility for teaching practical training to radiological workers. Contains potentially internally contaminated piping and ducting.
1 1706-KER: Water Studies Recirculation Building
Located north of 1706KE, the 1706-KER building supplied four high temperature, high pressure process tubes in the KE Reactor core. This portion of the facility was deactivated in 1964. The facility also served as a hot maintenance shop and decontamination facility and has been used as a development laboratory for various Hanford projects over the years. The 1706KER has a RCRA treatment system (Le. 1706KE Waste Treatment System) pending closure, procedural or otherwise. The hot cell, hoods and laboratory benches have been removed. The HEPA exhaust system has been deactivated. Currently provides storage and is in process of being completely deactivated. Currently unoccupied and not routinely surveyed, except when entered. The 0 ' level is a RMA, the -13' level is an RBA and contains a RMA, and the -27' level contains an RBA and a large CA.
1713-KE: Shop Building
Located outside on the East Side of 105 KE, this Corrugated sheet metal building is used for storage of non-radioactive materials and currently contains no radiological areas.
1714-KE: Oil & Paint Shop
1717-W1724-K Maintenance Shops
Located by inner fence perimeter access, these buildings currently houses the SNFP Maintenance and Work Control organizations. Contains shop and office areas. Currently contains no radiological areas.
1717-AKE: Fan House (Also referred to as 167K)
Located outside on the south side of 1717 K, this building contains fans for ventilating the tunnels. This is an unoccupied building and has no real access.
1908 KE & 1908 K Outfall Instrumentation Buildinp/Outfall Structure
Located next to the Columbia River, this structure contains the instrumentation to monitor our compliance with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. This is a normally unoccupied building and is only accessed to sample outfall or check instruments. Contains no radiological areas. However, the discharge flume that cames water to the outfall is contaminated from the past practice of discharging contaminated water through the process sewers of various facilities.
Other KE Structures
The KE area contains some mobile office trailers, which contain no radiological areas. There are some outdoor areas used for radioactive material storage and most of the areas discussed above, are located in an Underground Radioactive Material Area (UGRMA). There is a outdoor CA located at the railroad tracks between 105KE and 105KW. This was used to store N Reactor fuel shipping railroad cars.
KW Area
KW Basin
Preparations for use of 105 KW basin for storage of NReactor fuel began in 1978. Basin modifications were similar to those made at the 105 KE basin, but with several important differences. The bare concrete in the KW basin was cleaned and coated with epoxy paint. The water treatment system included IXCs charged with mixed-bed resin, a sand filter, a heat exchanger, and cartridge filters. The KW basin was filled with deionized water in 1979, and all additions to replace water lost through leakage or evaporation were made with deionized water. In addition, the fuel canisters were sealed.
Therefore, the fuel storage canisters in the 105 KW basin show only minor evidence of pitting corrosion after fourteen years in the 105 KW pool, in contrast to severe corrosion of aluminum alloy canisters in the 105 KE pool.
This basin is posted as a RBNRMA. There is a small (-400 ftz) Contamination area located in the transfer area and a few very small CA around some pump bases and the center of basin sample station. A review of surveys of these CA areas, typically shows, little or no contamination, The CA posting is for the contamination control needed during operations. There are various other radiological areas such as Fixed Contamination Areas (FCA) in the KW basin areas.
165-KW: SwitchGear, Control Room
Located south of the 105 KW building, this building was originally designed as a safety class, bomb resistant structure and was used to house the main control of the K Basins water plants and emergency power service. This building contains no radiological areas.
183-KW: Chlorine Vault
Located south of 105 KW, this building is used to store spent IXC after use. IXC have not been used in several years and these are awaiting disposal. This is an unoccupied building and contains a posted High Radiation Area (HRA) as well as a radiation area. Entries are only made to perform minimum survey requirements for monitoring. The building has no active systems or potential for changing radiological conditions.
1713-KW: Warehouse/Shop
Located on East Side of 105 KW, this building is currently used as shop area for Fluor Daniel Northwest crafts. This building contains no radiological areas.
1714-KW: Oil/Paint Storage
Located on East Side of 105 KW, this building is currently used for storage of materials and equipment. This building contains no radiological areas.
Other KW Structures
The KW area contains some mobile office trailers, which contain no radiological areas. There are some outdoor areas used for radioactive material storage and most of the areas discussed above, are located in an Underground Radioactive Material Area (UGRMA).
Cold Vacuum Drving Facility
Cold Vacuum Drving Facility Description
The mission of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) is to achieve the earliest possible removal of free water from Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs). The MCOs contain metallic uranium SNF that have been removed from the lOOK Area fuel storage water basins (Le., the K East and K West Basins) at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site in southeastern Washington state. Immediate removal of free water is necessary to halt waterinduced corrosion of exposed uranium surfaces and to allow the MCOs and their SNF payloads to be safely transported to the Hanford Site 200 East Area and stored within the SNF Project Canister Storage Building (CSB).
The CVDF is located within a few hundred yards of the basins, southwest of the 165KW Power Control Building and the 105KW Reactor Building. This facility site is in close proximity to all of the required utilities. The site area required for the facility and vehicle circulation is approximately 2 acres. Access and egress is provided by the main entrance to the lOOK inner area using existing roadways.
The CVDF will remove free water from the MCOs to reduce the potential for continued fuel-water corrosion reactions. The cold vacuum drying process involves the draining of bulk water from the MCO and subsequent vacuum drying. The MCO will be evacuated to a pressure of 8 torr or less and backfilled with an inert gas (helium). The MCO will be sealed and leak tested and then transported to the CSB within a sealed shipping cask. (The MCO remains within the same shipping Cask from the time it enters the basin to receive its SNF payload until it is removed from the Cask by the CSB MCO handling machine.)
The CVDF has a minimum of two drying stations (with capability to expand to four stations), and provides excess capacity to simplify transport operations as defined by WHC-SD-SNF-TI-016, Development of Design Basis Capacity for SNF Project Systems. The CVDF subproject acquired the required process systems, supporting equipment, and facilities. The cold vacuum drying operations result in an MCO containing dried fuel that is prepared for shipment to the CSB by the Cask transportation system. The CVDF subproject also provides equipment to dispose of solid wastes generated by the cold vacuum drying process and to load out process water removed from the MCO for transfer back to the appropriate handling facility. The Cask-MCO handling operation starts with the receipt of the Cask-MCO trailer at the CVDF process bay. Operators raise the door to allow the trailer to hack into the process bay.
The trailer is backed into a predetermined position, the landing legs are lowered to lift the front of the trailer to allow disengagement of the king-pin, and the tractor is disconnected. The tractor is driven out of the bay and the bay door is closed. Bay confinement is then established. Radiation surveys are conducted on the caskitrailer, and the quality assurance package is delivered to the CVDF shift operations manager.
Next, the process bay instrument air service is connected to the trailer air supply control station, and the trailer is leveled. Finally, a bridge is installed from the process bay mezzanine to the trailer work platform. Contamination control supplies are installed on the work platform. The top of the cask is prepared for venting, purging, and cask lid removal.
The MCO is vented to the cask headspace (the cask annulus was partially filled with water by operations at the KBasins). The cask headspace was purged and filled with helium at approximately 3 psig before it left the basin. During transport to the CVDF, hydrogen is generated and vented to the cask. Pressure also increases due to temperature increases associated with radioactive decay heat, solar heating, and water-uranium corrosion reactions. This gas is vented to the cold vacuum drying process vent system by means of special venting hardware and flex lines connected to the cask lid port and the CVDF process vent system. After venting, the cask headspace is purged with helium. Following purging, the cask lid is removed by the CVDF process bay overhead crane using a dedicated lifting fixture. The cold vacuum drying process hoodiseal ring assembly is installed onto the cask and the MCO is prepped for the process operations described below.
The process is performed per prescribed operating procedures, which include bulk water removal, helium purging, evacuation with and without helium purge, an initial pressure rebound test, an extended operation under vacuum at the base pressure of the system, a final pressure rebound test, an integrated leak test of the MCO mechanical seals, and backfilling the dried MCO with helium. The majority of all process actions are automatically actuated by the Monitoring and Control System (MCS) with input (start/stop commands) from the operators. There are minimal manual operator actions in the process sequences. Field operator actions are required, such as connecting MCO valve operators, DVHe rinseiblowdown after draining and tempered water connections. The control room operator actions include acknowledging alarms or instructing the MCS to proceed with the next step. Valve state changes, water temperature control and other process parameter changes are performed by the MCS.
Protection from causing off-site consequences is provided by maintaining water in the Cask-MCO annulus space, pressure venting via a 30 psig rupture disc and automatic actuation of the Safety Class Helium (SCHe) system and the Safety Class Instrument and Control (SCIC) system. The 30 psig vent path is passive and maintaining annulus water is, for the most part, passive. The SCIC will prevent the TW temperatures from exceeding the safety limit of 50°C by stopping the TW heater on high temperature detection.
There are two normal operator interfaces; the MCS computers and the SCIC Mode switch, both are located in the CVDF control room.
The SCIC seven position switch defines the MCO process mode and directly feeds this information into the Monitoring and Control System (MCS). While most sequences are held for operator permissives, some occur based solely on SCIC mode switch position. These are related to keeping hydrogen concentration low in the MCO and PWC receiving tanks.
Following the cold vacuum drying process, the Cask-MCO is prepared for shipment to the CSB. This operation is the reverse of the receipt operation. The Cask-MCO is cooled by the Tempered Water system; the MCO pressurized with helium, and is then closed. The Cask-MCO annulus is drained and dried with an instrument air purge, a He leak test of the MCO is performed, and the cask lid is then reinstalled. The trailer is connected to the tractor and released for shipment to the CSB.
Facility Classification
The CVDF process building is classified as a nonreactor nuclear facility according to DOE Order 6430.1A, Section 1300. The administrative area is a non-nuclear facility rated for office or business use in accordance with the Uniform Building Code (UI3C) (ICBO 1994).
Expected Source Term
Potential radiation sources associated with the cold vacuum drying process are:
The SNF and contaminated water inside the MCO Fuel will be remain contained inside the MCOicask assembly and not be directly exposed to the facility environment.
Dissolved fission products and fuel particulate contained in the water extracted from each MCO
The water removed from the MCO will be contained to the PWC system and VPS collection tank.
Radioactive particulate associated with gases that are purged or evacuated from the MCO These particulates will be vented via the process vent system through High Efficiency Particulate Filters (HEPA).
The radioactive particulate that could be carried by gases is confined, for the most part, inside the shielded MCO by the metal high-efficiency particulate air filter and is assumed to constitute an insignificant radiation source compared to the SNF and contaminated MCO water.
Conversion of fuel mass (grams) to radionuclide activity (curies) was done using the average fuel (Breismeister 1993) . The shielding attenuation properties for the bulk materials used in the ISO-PC calculations were obtained from the ISO-PC 1.98 data library. ISO-PC converted computed photon fluxes to dose rates (mrem/hr) using the ANSVANS-6.1 .l-1991 factors for anterior-to-posterior exposure. These fluence-todose conversion factors are also included in the ISO-PC data library.
ISO-PC was used to compute dose rates around the piping in the CVD process bay and to generate photon source rate distributions for input to MCNF". MCNPH was used to compute dose rates throughout the PWC room. Most MCNPH simulations were run in the rigorous photon transport mode. However, dose rates due to the photon source in the two IXMs were computed using the point-kernel option in MCNPH. This approximation was made because the IXMs are heavily shielded, and dose rate contribution from photon sources in the IXMs is very low compared to the other sources in the PWC room. The heavy shielding would have required modeling detail and computer time that were not warranted by the relatively low dose rates. Nuclear data in the MCNPH calculations were obtained from the MCNP ENDFIB-V library. As in the ISO-PC calculations, photon fluxes were converted to dose rates using ANSI/ANS-6.1,1-1991 factors. In the transportation, dose rates were tallied throughout the room on a threedimensional rectangular grid using a special option in MCNPH. In the point-kernel calculation, dose rates were tallied only in the vicinity of the IXMs.
Only photon radiation exposures were computed in HNF-2850. Existing shielding, pipes, and vessel walls effectively attenuate alpha and beta radiation. However, bremsstrahlung was accounted for in the ISO-PC calculations. Neutron dose rates from SNF sources are orders of magnitude less than photon dose rates outside unshielded, water-shielded, or concrete-shielded containers. This was verified by estimating the neutron dose rate for one case using the method given in Estimation ofNeutron Dose Ratessfrom Nuclear Waste Packages (Nelson 1996) . In that case, the neutron dose rate 30 cm from a check valve with a 3-g deposit of fuel particulate (an assumed worst case) was computed and compared to the photon dose rate reported in HNF-2850. The result of this comparison was that the neutron dose rate was only 0.04% of the photon dose rate (0.022 versus 52.1 mremh). Steel, on the other hand, is much more effective at attenuating photons than neutrons. Thus, the fractional contribution of neutrons to the total dose rate outside the MCO transportation cask will be higher. However, previous analyses (WHC-SD-SNF-CAVR-001 and HNF-SD-SNF-CN-026) determined that neutrons still account for only about 10% of the dose rate outside an MCO cask. Process Bay Dose Rates (* 3, The ISO-PC program was used to compute dose rates as a function of radial distance from, and axial position along, sections of 1 in, schedule 160 pipe containing water contaminated with fuel at 0.000127 gr./cc. ISO-PC was also used to compute dose rates as a function of distance from a check valve hypothesized to contain a deposit of 3 gr. fuel. These results are also shown in Table  4 -3.
These calculations were performed using estimated curie contents of the process water, not the actual testing results from HNF-4057. The piping values from From these values it can be seen that dose rates from the piping system in the process bays can be expected to not contribute appreciably to the dose rates in the bay directly from processing operations. However, build up over time could cause this piping to be a significant contributor along the west wall of the bay. By far, the presence of the MCO/cask unit will be the overriding contributor to dose rates in the bay. Contributions from the VPS collection tank can be expected to build over time, but due to the very low levels of particulate in the water collected in this tank, this is not expected to a significant source. Dose rate contour maps can be found in HNF-2850, Figures 6-1 -6-6 that show calculated dose rates at different locations in an operating process bay. Include these figures in this document.
.a Process Water Conditioning Room Dose Rates
The first source material inventory considered (Case A) was maximum loading of 62.6 grams of fuel that resulted in the full photon source rate. Case B was like Case A except that there was no source material in the PWC filter. Case C was like Case B except that the receipt tanks were assumed to contain only 10 percent of the source material present in the first case.
Case C is expected to be the most likely situation for the PWC room. HNF-4057 found that about 10% of the generated fuel particulate is carried out of the MCO during draining. The PWC filter is not expected to have a substantial dose rate initially, plus it is able to be backwashed. The peak dose rate was calculated to be ahout 24 m r e m h near the receipt tanks. Also, contour maps can be found in HNF-2850, Figures 6.7 -6.15 that show general dose rate calculations at different locations in the PWC room. Include the contour maps in this document.
Discussion of Expected Dose Rates
The dose rates for each component are calculated for theoretical maximum radionuclide concentrations in the process water. These rates are not expected to be reached until an unknown number of MCO's have been processed. Radiation and contamination surveys will be performed routinely in order to document radiological conditions that are present and to trend any changes in those conditions. As facility operations progress and radiological conditions change, posting criteria contained in AP-14-009 will be followed to maintain regulatory compliance.
Radiological Posting of CVD
CVD Siting
The entire CVD Facility is located inside a posted Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) established to indicate the presence of radiological areas within its boundary. Requirements for access to this area are a minimum of General Employee Radiological Training (GERT), with no requirement for access control verification of training completion. Access control is maintained by administrative procedures of the PHMC, by requiring all employees to have Hanford General Employee Training (HGET) and any visitor to have GERT to be badged.
CVD Facility Administrative Building
There are no radiological areas within the administrative building of the CVD Facility. However, areas adjacent to posted areas will be surveyed to verify effectiveness of controls.
Access Corridor
The transfer comdor will have no additional posting at the start of cold vacuum drying operations. This corridor does not contain any contaminated systems and is not expected to have dose rates requiring any further posting. Routine surveillance of this area will be performed to ensure area remains contamination free and does not require posting for dose control. No formal radiological access control is required for this area.
Process Bays
The radiological conditions of a process bay will change when an MCO/Cask shipping container has been brought into the bay and when it is removed because of dose rates from the MCO. Initially, it is not expected that the process systems in the bays will not contain enough contamination to effect the general area dose rates.
As the number of MCO's that have been processed increases, system contamination levels are expected to increase and therefore the dose rate levels will also increase.
A. Process Bav 5
This bay will be utilized to process MCO containers through the cold vacuum drying process. As such, many of its systems will become contaminated and require contamination control measures.
When an MCO is received, the bay will be posted as a radiation area (RA)/radiological buffer area (RBA) (for contamination control). During processing, a contamination area (CA) will be established around the work platform of the transport vehicle and the south mezzanine to allow for process connection activities. In addition, depending on the ability to keep the seal ring and process ventilation exhaust hood free of contamination, it may be necessary to establish a Contamination area at the storage location for those times when the unit is not in use.
The associated bay airlock will be posted as Radiological Buffer Area (RBA)/Radioactive Material Area ( M A ) as a contamination control buffer and for storage of radioactive material such as laundered protective clothing. An Eberline PCM-1B will be used to survey personnel exiting the RBA as well as for whole body surveys required after CA entries. This personnel monitor is located sufficiently close to the RBA exit to satisfy it use as a exit monitor. It is located approximately five feet from the boundary. This with the shiftly routine surveillance of this area is more than satisfactory in meeting this requirement.
During other activities in the bay such as maintenance, it will be necessary to establish temporary radiological areas for control during these activities.
Radiation and contamination levels in the process bay will be evaluated after the MCOiCask shipping container has completed the cold vacuum drying process and is removed. A routine surveillance program will be used to characterize the area and determine any needed posting changes that are needed to maintain regulatory compliance.
Formal access control is required for accessing this area to verify qualifications and training of personnel needing access per AP-14-004, Radiological Area Access Control.
B. Process Bav 4
This bay will also be utilized to process MCO containers through the cold vacuum drying process. As such, many of its systems will become contaminated and require contamination control measures.
When an MCO is received, the bay will be posted as a radiation area (RA)/radiological buffer area (RBA) (for contamination control).
During processing, a contamination area (CA) will be established around the work platform of the transport vehicle and the south mezzanine to allow for process connection activities. In addition, depending on the ability to keep the seal ring and process ventilation exhaust hood Free of contamination, it may be necessary to establish a contamination area at the storage location for those times when the unit is not in use.
Radiation and contamination levels in the process bay will be evaluated after the MCO/Cask shipping container has completed the cold vacuum drying process and is removed. A routine surveillance program will be used to characterize the area and determine any needed posting changes that are needed to maintain regulatory compliance.
Formal access control is required for accessing this area to verify qualifications and training of personnel needing access per AP-14.004, Radiological Area Access Control.
C. Process Bay 3
This bay will not be used for process operations but will be fully outfitted for such operations, except for testing and some connections. It is expected that these components will be used for spares for the operating bays and possibly for storage of radioactive material. The PWC line from process bay 4 & 5 operations passes through this bay along the west wall and is accessible. It is not expected that this line will contribute significantly to the dose rates in the bay. A routine surveillance program will be used to characterize the area and determine any needed posting changes that are needed to maintain regulatory compliance.
At the beginning of operations, this area will be posted as "Internally Contaminated Systems.. ." due to presence of installed, contaminated components. If radioactive material is stored in this area, a separate RMA will be established in a designated area in accordance with AP-14-001.
Formal access control will be not required for accessing this area normally. If and when a RMA is established, then formal access control will be required for accessing these RMA's to verify qualifications and training of personnel per AP-I 4-004, Radiological Area Access Control.
D. Process Bay 2
This bay will not be used for process operations and will not be fully outfitted for such operations. It is expected that this area will he used possibly for storage of radioactive material. The PWC line from process bay 4 & 5 operations passes through this bay along the west wall and is accessible. It is not expected that this line will contribute significantly to the dose rates in the bay. A routine surveillance program will be used to characterize the area and determine any needed posting changes that are needed to maintain regulatory compliance. At the beginning of operations, this area will be posted as "Internally Contaminated Systems.. ." due to presence of installed, contaminated components. If radioactive material is stored in this area, a separate RMA will he established in a designated area in accordance with AP-14-001.
Formal access control will be not required for accessing this area normally. If and when a RMA is established, then formal access control will he required for accessing these RMA's to verify qualifications and training of personnel per AP-14-004, Radiological Area Access Control.
E. Process Bav 1
This bay will be used to off-load the processed MCO water collected from operations, into a 5,000-gallon tanker truck for transport to the Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility (LETF) for further processing. The curie content of this water is estimated to be low due to the repeated processing through an IXM and subsequent high efficiency filtration prior to entering the storage tank. However, it is still considered contaminated and is to he treated as such. The PWC line from process bay 4 & 5 operations passes through this bay along the west wall and is accessible. It is not expected that this line will contribute significantly to the dose rates in the bay. This area may also be used for storage for radioactive material and for a work area for work with contaminated materials. With this bays close proximity to the PWC room and the orientation of the building this room will be posted as an RBA for contamination and radiation control.
The associated bay airlock will be posted as Radiological Buffer Area (RBA)/Radioactive Material Area (RMA) as a contamination control buffer and for storage of radioactive material such as laundered protective clothing. An Eberline PCM-1B will be used to survey personnel exiting the RBA as well as for whole body surveys required after CA entries. This personnel monitor is located sufficiently close to the RBA exit to satisfy it use as a exit monitor. It is located approximately five feet from the boundary. This with the shiftly routine surveillance of this area is more than satisfactory in meeting this requirement.
Process Water Conditioning Room
The PWC room is utilized to collect and process wastewater from MCO processing operations.
This room contains the highest source term next to a loaded MCO. This source term is contained in various shielded and unshielded configurations.
The waste water is collected in two receiving tanks and circulated through an Ion Exchange Module ( E M ) which performs ion exchange and some filtering (to -20 micron). Following IXM processing, the water is passed through a high efficiency filter and stored in a 5,000 gallon tank awaiting off-load to a tanker truck for shipment to LETF.
This room has the potential to become a High Radiation Area (HRA) due to design configurations. Due to this potential, this room must be able to have HRA controls invoked at any time and must be set up for such. Items such as crash bars on doors and single keyed locks with'key control will be required. At the start of operations, this room will be posted as a RA/RBA and will be closely monitored. The 5,000-gallon tank is not expected to contribute significantly to the overall dose rates.
This room shares a airlock with bay 1 and uses the same egress process and controls Formal access control is required for accessing this area to verify qualifications and training of personnel needing access per AP-14-004, Radiological Area Access Control.
Mechanical Room
The mechanical room contains several radiologically contaminated ventilation systems, the process hood ventilation system and general exhaust system. These systems are made up of contaminated ventilation ducting, HEPA filter housings containing HEPA filter units and pre-filters. These components are located in the south end of the room and are not expected to have a significant external dose rate during processing operations. At the beginning of operations, this area will be posted as "Internally Contaminated Systems.. ." due to presence of installed, contaminated components. If these systems are breached, then radiological conditions will need to be reevaluated and postings changed per criteria HNF-5173, Tables 2-3 and 2-4. A routine surveillance program will be used to characterize the area and determine any needed posting changes that are needed to maintain regulatory compliance. radioactive material other than the installed systems will not be stored in this area.
Formal access control will not be required for accessing this area normally.
Health Phvsics Counting Room
This room is located off the access comdor and will be used for the counting of radiological swipes, air samples, and other materials. In addition, radioactive sources needed for radiological operations will be stored in this room. Due to the nature of these activities, it is necessary to post this area as a RBNRMA. Personnel survey will be performed by the HPTs themselves due to their site qualification of self-survey.
Decontamination Room
This room is located off the access corridor and will only be used for personnel decontamination if needed. Until such time as the facility is used, it will remain unposted. Routine surveillance of this area will be performed to ensure area remains contamination free and does not require posting for dose control. No formal radiological access control is required for this area until as such time as the room is used for its intended purpose.
Unintemptable Power Supplv Room
This room is located off the access comdor and contains backup power for essential systems. This room does not contain any contaminated systems and is not expected to have dose rates requiring any further posting. Routine surveillance of this area will be performed to ensure area remains contamination free and does not require posting for dose control. No formal radiological access control is required for this area.
Securitv Room
This room is located off the access corridor and contains security systems for the facility. This room does not contain any contaminated systems and is not expected to have dose rates requiring any further posting. Routine surveillance of this area will be performed to ensure area remains contamination free and does not require posting for dose control. No formal radiological access control is required for this area. This room is located off the access comdor and contains air and DI water systems for the facility. This room does not contain any contaminated systems and is not expected to have dose rates requiring any further posting. Routine surveillance of this area will be performed to ensure area remains contamination free and does not require posting for dose control. No formal radiological access control is required for this area.
(11.10)
Historical Basin Radiological Comparison
The Samples are collected routinely and analyzed for radiological constituents in order to monitor performance of the water treatment system and to characterize spent water treatment components for disposal. The radionuclides of particular interest are the fission products I3'Cs, "Sr, tritium, and the transuranic isotopes Z4'Am and 239'240Pn. Due to the age of the fuel, short lived activation products such as Co, are no longer present in significant amounts.
Routine Water Analvsis and Isotopes ofInterest 54 60 Mn, *'Fe, and to a lesser extent,
Cesium 137
The isotope '"Cs is a medium-energy gamma emitter that is released directly from the uranium metal fuel as it corrodes. The I3' Cs embedded in the concrete is the primary source of radiation exposure in the KE basin. This "bath tub ring" was established in the first years of operation, and even ten (10) years of maintaining good water quality had not lessened its impact on general area dose rates. Localized "hot spots" caused by "' (2s that is trapped in piping and valves also contributes to dose rates. However, the 137Cs in the water is a secondary source contributing 3 to 5 mRem/h to the general dose rates.
The walls in KW basin were coated with epoxy paint so there is no "bath tub ring", and 137Cs concentrations in the water are much lower. Cesium is present in the water as a highly soluble cation (positively charged ion). It is removed from the water by the cation resin bed of the IXMs. Only a small fraction is removed by filtration.
Strontium 90
Sr is a high-energy beta emitter also released directly to basin water from the corroding fuel. Because the beta radiation is easily shielded, the '"Sr does not contribute much to dose rates in the basin. Its primary hazard is in the form of contamination and internal deposition.
Tritium 90
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen and is present in the basin water as part of the water molecule. The water treatment system can neither filter or ion exchange the tritium out of the basin water. The concentration of tritium is a function of its release rate from the corroding fuel and evaporation or leakage from the basin. Fortunately, the concentrations of tritium found in KBasins do not present a significant hazard in terms of dose rates, contamination, or internal
( 1 1 . 1 1 ) deposition .
Transuranic Radionuclides
By definition, a TRU isotope has an atomic number greater than 92 (uranium), has a half-life greater than 20 years, and is an alpha emitter. The K Basins contain many TRU isotopes; however, 241Am and 239'z40Pu account for greater than 95 percent of all alpha activity. In the KW basin, the TRUs are mostly contained inside the fuel storage canisters and don't present significant contamination problems. In the KE basin, where the fuel is exposed directly to the basin water and a large volume of sludge is present, the TRU concentrations are several times higher and present many problems.
The chemistry of TRU isotopes is very complex. They are present as both cations (positive ions) and anions (negative ions) that can be removed by the EMS. They can also be removed as large particles by filtration. Finally, they exist as colloidal (very small) particles that can't be either exchanged or filtered. The form that the TRUs take changes depending on work going on in the basins and water chemistry conditions. Due to the corrosion of iron bearing materials, the water chemistry tends to cause a deposition of an orange "slime" layer on materials and components located in the basin. This layer has been analyzed and been shown to contain a high concentration of alpha emitters, primarily 24'Am. Care must be exercised when handling material removed from the water.
The Z4'Am and z39'24"Pu in the KE basin are the primary sources of the offsite dose to the public due to air emissions from the facility. While there is no limit placed by the regulatory agencies on their concentration in the basin water, the treatment system is effective in removing transuranics. The current air permit uses CsI3' as the limiting isotope in the water which is easily monitored and ensures that the treatment systems are operating satisfactory. The limits deal with concentrations in the air (worker exposure) and quantities released to the environment (offsite dose). However, the concentrations in the water are kept as low as possible, given the limitations of the water treatment system, to minimize releases.
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Regulatory and Contractual Basis
CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection
Subpart E--Monitoring in the Workplace Sec. 835.401(a)(4): "Detect the gradual buildup of radioactive material in the workplace; a n d Sec. 835.401(a) (5): "Verify the effectiveness of engineering and process controls in containing radioactive materials and reducing radiation exposure."
HNF-SP-1145, FDH Radiation Protection Program
Section VII, Items 74-75: Sets policy and commitment to meet above referenced 10CFR835 sections by following article 551.12 ofthe Hanford Site Radiological Controls Manual (HNF-5173.
HNF-5173, Hanford Site Radiological Controls Manual
Article 551.12:
Monitoring data in each building or area should be compiled and reviewed at least quarterly. Changes or trends should be noted and corrective actions assigned.
Requirements Discussion "F-5173, Article 551.12 is clearly intended for locations where processes and/or activities could cause a gradual increase in radiation dose rates and/or contamination levels. At the SNF Project there are a number of areas in which there are no active systems, processes, or other work that could cause levels to increase. Since these locations do not meet the intended purpose for Article 551.12, trending radiological conditions in these locations is not required.
All radiological areas at the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project have been analyzed for the potential for increasing dose rates and/or contamination levels. Based on this analysis SNF Project radiological areas have been placed in two categories. The first category is the areas where radiological conditions are stable and specific trending is not needed. The second category is the areas where radiological conditions may change.
Based on this analysis, the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project does not perform specific trending analysis of all radiological areas. Those areas that do contain processes or have potential for gradual changes in radiological conditions are analyzed and specifically trended.
105KE
Various uncontrolled areas, such as office trailers and non-radiological facilities, are surveyed on various frequencies. Frequency depends on potential for contamination spread to these facilities. The survey is performed by G-M contamination survey instrument. Documented on Scheduled Radiation Survey Report (BD-6002-549).
(11.1) 
Non-Routinely Surveyed Areas
Current Radiological Trending Program
Described below are the current trending programs, by area, that are in place at the SNF Project. Other areas do not warrant specific trending as specified in "I-5173, article 551.12. These will be updated as conditions, use, or occupancy changes.
KE Basin
9.1.1
Currently, the KE basin has a standardized radiation and contamination survey performed monthly. The radiation survey has been ongoing for several years and the contamination survey is a new surveillance. These surveys are in addition to current routine monitoring and are specialized to ensure consistency between surveys, by specifying locations for monitoring. Locations were selected based on system locations and potential for change in conditions due to operations. Figure 9 .1 details the radiation survey points for the KE Basin and figure 9.2 details
KE Basin Radiation and Contamination Trending
the contamination survey points. This data is recorded on a Radiation Survey Report (BD-6002-600) and plotted and trended monthly in the SNFP Radiological Performance Report. The radiation data is plotted by main area (main basin, chiller by, transfer area) with an highilowlaverage graph. Basin water level and I3'Cs concentrations in the water influence the main basin radiation levels. The basin water level affects how much of the "bathtub" ring is exposed which affects dose rates. The I3'Cs concentration affects the large area plane source from the water itself. Figure 9 .3 shows the report format for this data. The contamination data will be reported similarly. 
Date
These locations have gamma dose rates taken at knee and chest level and neutron levels at grating level. Only the chest level graphs are reported. The small variations in chest and knee do not warrant reporting both. Both will continue to be taken during the survey. Based on review of neutron dose rates and the absence of any detectable levels, the neutron dose rate monitoring will be discontinued until such time as process or conditions change warrants neutron monitoring.
9.1.2
KE Basin airborne contamination levels have historically tracked from routine air monitoring locations. Routine monitoring stations operate 24 hourdday, 7 daysiweek and are analyzed weekly at the SNF Counting Facility, located in 1706 KE. The samples are analyzed by gross alphaheta counting initially and after a 7-day decay. The 7-day decay allows for decay of shortlived radon daughters, which interfere with determination of long-lived activity. The data is reported monthly in the Radiological Performance Report. Figure 9 .4 is a typical gaph used to report the information. Both alpha and beta activity is reported. Currently, the KW basin has a standardized radiation survey performed semi-annually. The radiation survey has been ongoing for several years but only in the last year has it been performed using a microrem meter. The locations were typically only over the main basin areas. This surveillance has been updated to cover the entire basin as indicated on Figure 9 .5 and the frequency will change to monthly. These surveys are in addition to current routine monitoring and are specialized to ensure consistency between surveys, by specifying locations for monitoring. Locations were selected based on system locations and potential for change in conditions due to operations. No standardized contamination survey is performed because most of the basin is a WARMA, which has a limit less than HNF-5173, Table 2 -2 limits and a specialized survey would only trend negative data. A review of past radiological problem reports (RPR) has not indicated any trend in contamination incidents in these areas. Figure 9 .5: KW Basin Radiation Survey Points ~ w -N These locations have gamma dose rates taken at knee and chest level and neutron levels at gating level. Only the chest level graphs will be reported. The small variations in chest and knee do not warrant reporting both. Both will continue to be taken during the survey. Based on review of neutron dose rates and the absence of any detectable levels, the neutron dose rate monitoring has been discontinued until processes or conditions change to warrant neutron monitoring.
KE Basin Airborne Radioactivity Trending
KW Basin Radiation and Contamination Trending
A change in the locations and frequency is warranted due to not-to-distant-future changes in facility equipment and operations. Several new survey points were added and the frequency was changed to monthly from semi-annual. The new Integrated Water Treatment System (IWTS) is currently being constructed and will greatly affect the dose rates in the transfer area of the basin as well as some minor changes in other areas. This data has not typically been reported in the monthly Radiological Performance Report due to its low levels and little or no change in the dose rates. With the implementation of the new monthly surveillance, this data will be reported similarly to Figure 9 .3.
9.2.2
KW Basin airborne contamination levels have been historically tracked from routine air monitoring locations. Routine monitoring stations operate 24 hoursiday, 7 daysiweek and are analyzed weekly at the SNF Counting Facility, located in 1706 KE. The samples are analyzed by gross alphaheta counting initially and after a 7-day decay. The 7-day decay allows for decay of short-lived radon daughters, which interfere with determination of long-lived activity. The data is reported monthly in the Radiological Performance Report. Figure 9 .6 is a typical graph used to report the information. Both alpha and beta activity is reported. The CVD will a standardized radiation survey performed monthly. These surveys are in addition to current routine monitoring and are specialized to ensure consistency between surveys, by specifying locations for monitoring. Locations were selected based on system locations and potential for change in conditions due to operations. Figures 9.7 and 9.8 detail the radiation survey points for the CVD. 
KW Basin Airborne Radioactivity Trending
